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Federal Witness Immunity Act: Expanding the
Scope of Pre-Testimony Judicial Review
During the course of the extensive "Watergate"'investigations, one
primary source of publicized information has been the testimony of
witnesses appearing before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.2 Some of the most revealing disclosures
have been made by witnesses who admitted being personally involved
in improper, unethical and illegal activities. In order to solicit such
testimony, the Select Committee has at times used .the device of granting immunity3 to witnesses pursuant to the relevant provisions (hereinafter referred to as the Federal Witness Immunity Act or 1970 Act) 4
5
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
The immunity grants were conferred by orders of the federal district
court upon application therefor by the Select Committee. In the case
of two major witnesses, Jeb Stuart Magruder and John W. Dean, 111,1
the orders were given by the court despite the strenuous objections
of the Special Prosecutor, 7 Archibald Cox. Mr. Cox maintained that
1. The term originated with the burglary of the Watergate Hotel in Washington,
D.C., but has come to be a reference to all aspects of the recent political scandal.
2. The Select Committee was established to investigate all charges of illegality
concerning the 1972 presidential campaign.
3. Generally, immunity statutes are based on a literal interpretation of the fifth
amendment's version of the privilege against self-incrimination, namely that a person
cannot be forced to give evidence which might be used against him in a criminal prosecution. The theory is that the privilege (of silence) may in individual cases properly
be supplanted by a coextensive form of protection. Thus, the witness may be compelled to testify notwithstanding a claim of the privilege but will be provided with some
form of immunity in return. As to the extent of protection provided by the current
statute, see note 8 infra. For a comprehensive analysis of prior federal immunity legislation, see Dixon, The Filth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes (pts. I-11),
22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 447, 554 (1954).
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1970) [hereinafter cited as "Federal Witness Immunity
Act" or "1970 Act"] are the provisions relating to federal immunity grants. The statute was originally introduced as the Federal Immunity of Witnesses Act in both houses
of Congress, H.R. 11157, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 2122, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969). It applies to all federal proceedings and replaces over fifty federal immunity
statutes. H.R. REp. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
5. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified in scattered
sections of the United States Code).
6. Application of United States Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270 (D.D.C. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Select Committee on
Campaign Activities].
7. The office of Special Prosecutor was established by Attorney General Richard-
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certain conditions limiting the publication of compelled testimony
should be attached to the court's order." The court heard argument
on the question whether a court might properly exercise any discretion to deny an immunity request of the legislative branch even though
procedural requirements were met. The court's conclusion, stated by
Chief Judge Sirica, was:
[Iln this case, [the court's] duties are purely ministerial, and
. . . any attempted exercise of discretion on its part, either to
deny the requests or to grant immunity with conditions, would be an
assumption of power not possessed by the Court.9
The specific section of the 1970 Act which controls the procedure
for granting immunity to witnesses testifying at congressional proceedings is 18 U.S.C. § 6005.1" On its face, section 6005 does cast the
son to maintain a prosecutorial investigation of Watergate independent of the executive branch. Mr. Cox took the oath of office on May 25, 1973. N.Y. Times, May
26, 1973, § 1, at 11, col. 1.
In Select Committee on Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. at 1272 n.1, the court
explained that it considered the Special Prosecutor to be acting, for the purpose of his
assignment, in the capacity of Attorney General.
8. Mr. Cox's concern was primarily with the effect such publicized testimony
would have on future prosecutions. Under the 1970 Act, even witnesses granted immunity may subsequently be prosecuted. The statute (§ 6002) deals with "use" as opposed to "transaction" immunity. Transaction immunity, the standard prescribed by
most former statutes, precludes prosecution for any transaction or affair about which
a witness testifies. Use immunity, by contrast, is a grant with limitations. Rather
than barring any subsequent related prosecution, it acts only to suppress in any such
prosecution the witness's testimony and evidence derived directly or indirectly from that
testimony. Evidence obtained wholly independently of immunized testimony may serve
as a basis for prosecuting the witness for activities and transactions including those
covered in his own statements.
The Supreme Court has held that in any subsequent prosecution of a witness, the
government bears the burden of proof to show that the evidence used was derived from
a source wholly independent of the compelled testimony or its fruits. Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
9. Select Committee on Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. at 1272.
10. § 6005. Congressional proceedings.
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before either House of
Congress, or any committee, or any subcommittee of either House, or any
joint committee of the two Houses, a United States district court shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of
a duly authorized representative of the House of Congress or the committee concerned, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as
provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) Before issuing an order under subsection (a) of this section,
a United States district court shall find that(1) in the case of a proceeding before either House of Congress, the
request for such an order has been approved by an affirmative vote of
a majority of the Members present of that House;
(2) in the case of a proceeding before a committee or a subcommittee
of either House of Congress or a joint committee of both Houses, the
request for such an order has been approved by an affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the members of the full committee; and
(3) ten days or more prior to the day on which the request for such
an order was made, the Attorney General was served with notice of an
intention to request the order.
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role of the court in terms of ministerial duty. The language seems
mandatory:
[A] United States district court shall issue . . . upon the request of a duly authorized representative of the House of Congress
or the committee concerned, an order. .... 11
The court's decision seems correct on the particular facts presented.1 2 However, the above-quoted language of the court and terms
of the statute raise fundamental questions concerning the Federal Witness Immunity Act: What is the function of the district court when
an order for immunity is requested by the legislative branch? If the
court is to exercise no discretion whatsoever, why is a court order required? Is there any ground upon which the court may properly
deny the request for an order? The search for answers to these questions necessitates dealing not only with statutory interpretation, but also with perplexing issues of constitutional dimension.
INTRODUCTION:

THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

In attempting to define the judicial function with respect to immunity grants, 1 3 there is a pervading problem which must be given at least
brief consideration initially. The problem is the potential conflict between the three branches of government concerning which branch
(c) Upon application of the Attorney General, the United States district court shall defer the issuance of any order under subsection (a) of
this section for such period, not longer than twenty days from the date
of the request for such order, as the Attorney General may specify.
§ 6002, referred to in subsection (a) of § 6005, defines the practical import of immunity whether in a court, grand jury, legislative, or administrative setting.
§ 6002. Immunity generally.
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses,
or a committee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
with the order.
11.
18 U.S.C. § 6005 (1973) (emphasis added).
12. See further discussion at notes 123-27 infra and accompanying text.
13. It is important to note that this writing deals with the subject of intentional
immunity grants which result from discretionary prosecutorial decisions to exchange immunity for needed testimony. Unintentional immunity grants, on the other hand, result
from the fact that exclusion of illegally seized evidence and its fruits is the sanction
for a violation by governmental agents of constitutional rights. Unintentional immunity grants are judicially imposed.
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should control the granting of immunity." An inquiry into the nature
of immunity reveals the competing interests which give rise to this conflict.
The purpose of the Federal Witness Immunity Act, and immunity
statutes in general, is to satisfy the state's need for information while
guaranteeing the witness the protection of the privilege against selfincrimination. 1 5 Thus, the intentional granting of immunity is basically an investigative tool. At first glance, then, it seems that the executive branch is best suited to control immunity grants. However,
Congress has increasingly taken on a role as investigator, and may
be impeded in its efforts to obtain information by witnesses' availing
themselves of the fifth amendment privilege.'" It would be helpful
to Congress if it had authority to grant immunity to witnesses at congressional proceedings. Of course, the grant of such immunity would
seriously affect the executive branch in its future efforts to prosecute
the witness.' 7 Historically, there has been considerable controversy
as to whether the legislative or executive branch should control the
granting of immunity at congressional proceedings. 8 Indeed, this
controversy was one of the factors which led to the establishment of
the court order requirement in recent federal statutes. 9 The idea
14. For a concise discussion of the development of the separation of powers doctrine and its relation to immunity statutes, see Rogge, The New Federal Immunity Act
and the ludicial Function, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 109, 110-12 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Rogge].
15. See note 3 supra.
16. Read literally, the fifth amendment would seem to confine the guarantee against
self-incrimination to criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that the fifth amendment extends beyond defendants to protect any witness in
any type of proceeding which can legally demand testimony, when such testimony
might ultimately be used against the person in a criminal proceeding. McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52,
94 (1964) (White, J., concurring); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444
(1972).
The privilege thus extends to both criminal and civil proceedings, including grand
jury, legislative, and administrative investigations, as well as civil and criminal trials.
17. See note 8 supra.
18. Rogge, supra note 14, at 112, argues:
[I]f there are to be immunity acts, the power to grant immunity should
rest with the investigative agencies of the executive branch of government.
The primary business of Congress is to legislate, not to investigate offenses.
For this purpose there is no need of any power to grant immunity.
Others, though, have placed different priorities on the various responsibilities of
Congress. For example, in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n.33 (1957),
the Sunreme Court stated:
[There is a] power of the Congress to inquire into and publicize corruption,
maladministration or inefficiency in the agencies of the Government. That
was the only kind of activity described by Woodrow Wilson in Congressional
Government when he wrote: "The informing function of Congress should be
preferred even to its legislative function." [Citation omitted.] From the earliest times in its history, the Congress has assiduously performed an "informing
function" of this nature.
19. In a discussion of the Immunity Act of 1954, Act of August 20, 1954, ch. 769,
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of the court acting as arbiter of a dispute between the executive and
legislative branches on an issue of policy illustrates the serious type

of separation of powers problems which have been presented by some
immunity statutes.20
It is evident that the executive and legislative branches have interests which arguably support vesting in either or both of them the authority to grant immunity. Other than the questionable role of arbiter,
what justifiable interest does the court have in this process?
The real need for judicial participation is best visualized by recalling
the essence of the immunity concept. It involves a conflict between
governmental authority and the individual's fifth amendment privilege.
The Supreme Court held in Counselman v. Hitchcock that immunity
laws may replace the privilege against self-incrimination provided that
protections under immunity laws are coextensive with the protections
afforded by the privilege itself. 2 Thus, a primary concern of the district court must be to safeguard the constitutional rights of the witness. While there is little reason to vest in the court the initial power
to grant immunity,22 it is submitted that there is good reason for vesting in the court the power to prevent the granting of immunity in
certain cases. Furthermore, it must be recognized that, regardless of
the precise wording of a particular immunity statute, the court has
certain inherent powers to preserve the rights of potential defendants 3
68 Stat. 745, one writer stated:
The legislative history reveals that the lawmakers were puzzled by the procedural problem of how and by whom the immunity power should be exercised. [Citations omitted.] Congress could not determine whether the immunity power should be exercised by the committee or the Attorney General.
The dilemma was resolved by providing that the district court, with access
to the views of both, must approve the grant of immunity.
Note, Immunization of Congressional Witnesses under the Compulsory Testimony Act:
Constitutionality of the Function of the District Courts, 22 U. C. L. REv. 657, 660
(1955).
20. See further discussion of this issue at notes 34-37 infra and accompanying text.
21. 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892). Precisely, the Court held "that legislation cannot abridge a constitutional privilege, and that it cannot replace or supply one, at least
unless it is so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect." Id. at 585.
See Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 54, 78 (1964), and Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 450 (1972).
22. The Eighth Circuit held in Isaacs v. United States, 256 F.2d 654 (1958), that
a federal district court was without authority to grant immunity to a witness before
a federal grand jury. The district court, at the request of the United States Attorney,
ordered the witness to answer certain questions of the grand jury. Then, apparently
on its own initiative, the court purported to "extend immunity to him in connection
with any answer he may give ....
." Id. at 657. The witness still refused to answer
on fifth amendment grounds and consequently was held in contempt. In setting aside
the contempt conviction, the court of appeals stated: "[T]he court was without authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The attempt to grant such an immunity
was not within the judicial power but was an attempted exercise of executive or legislative power." Id. at 661 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
23. Since use immunity does not preclude future prosecution of the witness, he remains a potential defendant. See note 8 supra.
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and to impose restraints on congressional investigations.

4

THE DEVELOPING ROLE OF THE DISTRICT COURT
IN IMMUNITY LEGISLATION

Because an intentional grant of immunity is basically an investigative tool, its control has traditionally been vested, by statute, in the
executive branch. In fact, under all immunity statutes enacted prior
to 1954, Congress imposed neither procedural nor other conditions
on the discretion of governmental prosecutors to grant immunity in
exchange for compelled testimony.2 5 Under the "automatic" immunity statutes, which did not require a witness's claim of the self-incrimination privilege as a precondition to immunity, immunity was obtained
automatically whenever a witness testified in a proceeding covered by
an immunity act.2" The interrogator had little opportunity to avoid
immunity by termination of the questioning since he was often given
no forewarning as to when self-incriminating statements were about
to be made by the witness.
Under the "claim" immunity statutes, which required a witness to
claim his privilege, immunity was acquired at the point when the witness testified under a direction to respond despite his claim. Here
the interrogator was forewarned. When the claim was made, he could
preserve opportunity for criminal prosecution by honoring the self-incrimination plea, rather than forcing testimony under an applicable immunity act.27
Immunity has also been conferred, without statutory authorization,
when a law enforcement agency or the United States Attorney has
promised to refrain from prosecuting in order to secure a witness's cooperation. This kind of informal immunity grant, initiated by prosecutorial decision, has seemingly been held valid even though not authorized by statute.2
In 1954, a statute29 was enacted which included a transactional immunity provision for national security investigations conducted by Congress.3 0 The 1954 Act introduced for the first time the requirement
24. See further discussion infra at note 104 et seq. and accompanying text.
25. II WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAws 1416 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
26. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
27. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 25, at 1417.
28. Id. at 1420.
29. The Immunity Act of 1954, Act of August 20, 1954, ch. 769, 68 Stat. 745.
30. The initial immunity legislation, enacted by Congress in 1857, granted complete
transactional immunity to a congressional witness automatically. Act of January 24,
1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155. This statute was grossly abused by wrongdoers seeking
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of application for court approval, or a court order, before immunity
could be granted. 31 The Act also required that Congress notify the
Attorney General of its desire to immunize a recalcitrant witness and
that the Attorney General be given an opportunity to be heard before
the federal district court granted the conditional request.
The legislative history of the 1954 Act indicates that there were
two interrelated reasons for the establishment of a court order requirement. First, the legislators could not agree as to whether the
immunity power should be exercised by the committee or the Attorney
General, so the final decision was left to the court. 3 2 Second, some
members of Congress feared the possibility of "immunity baths" and
sought to prevent committees from granting immunity without consulting the executive branch. 33 No cases were ruled on by the Supreme
Court under the congressional investigation section of the 1954 Act,
but many writers have argued that it posed a serious separation of
powers problem."
The Act apparently contemplated that the federal
district court should attempt to settle a dispute between a House of
Congress desiring to grant immunity in support of congressional interests and an Attorney General request in support of executive interests
that no immunity be granted.33 Such a conflict seems not to be con"immunity baths" and was amended in 1862 to provide only that the testimony given
by a congressional witness could not be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding
against the witness. Act of January 24, 1862, ch. II, 12 Stat. 333. This limited form
of use immunity did not protect the witness against use of information derived from
his testimony.
A statute providing similar protection to witnesses at judicial proceedings was held
constitutionally inadequate to supplant the fifth amendment privilege in Counselman
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
Thus, although the 1862 Act remained in the
federal statutes, it was not worded broadly enough to overcome a plea of the fifth
amendment. This was the only immunity provision available to congressional investigating comm:ttees until 1954. Since there was, therefore, no adequate valid immunity
statute applicable, the fifth amendment could be (and was, in fact) successfully
invoked by witnesses before congressional committees. Wendel, Compu!sory Immunity
Legislation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege: New Developments and New Confusion,
10 ST. Louis U. L. J. 327, 349 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Wendel].
The 1954 Act embodied the absolute (transactional) immunity formula which was
sustained in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595 (1896).
31. The language of the 1954 Act was less mandatory than that of the 1970 Act.
Subsection (a) provided: "Such an order may be issued by a United States district
court judge upon application by a duly authorized representative of the Congress or
of the committee concerned." Subsection (b) said that the House or committee must
secure "the approval of the United States district court" before granting immunity.
(Emphasis added.)
32. See note 19 supra.
33. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 25, at 1408.
34. For discussions of the 1954 Act and the separation of powers problem, see
Dixon, The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Federal Immunity Statutes (pts. III), 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 501, 627, and especially at 640-46, 655-57 (1955); Wendel, supra note 30, at 353-67; Rogge, supra note 14, at 126-33.
35. This was basically the factual situation confronted by the court in Select Committee on Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270 (D.D.C. 1973). See text accompanying note 8 supra.
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stitutionally suited for judicial resolution. 8 The court would be required -to make a policy judgment without the benefit of any legal standards upon which to base its decision. 7
The Immunity Act of 1954 contained a separate immunity provision
applicable to federal grand jury proceedings in the area of national
security. This section also required a court order as a precondition
to immunity. Before a court order could be obtained, the United
States Attorney conducting the grand jury proceeding was required
to certify that immunity would be in the public interest. The Attorney
General was then required to approve the certification. 38 In Ullmann
v. United States 9 the Supreme Court upheld this section of the Act
and rebutted the argument that the Act violated the separation of
powers doctrine by imposing a nonjudicial function on the district
court.
The question presented in Ullmann was whether the district court
had discretion to review the United States Attorney's determination
that the testimony of a grand jury witness was "necessary to the public
The Court narrowly construed the statute and held that
interest."4
the district judge was given no discretion to deny the order on the
ground that the public interest did not warrant it.4 1 The Court said
that under the terms of the grand jury provision, the duty of the district
court was simply to certify that the statutory requirement of a finding
of public necessity had been made by the United States Attorney and
approved by the Attorney General.42
Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter carefully avoided the
broader language of the Act regarding immunity in congressional inRogge, supra note 14, at 133, states:
Especially should the federal courts challenge the imposition on them of
a function that would involve them in the business of investigating offenses
rather than judging deviants, a function which, when in the hands of the judiciary, involves the importation of a feature of the inquisitional system.

36.

Paragraphs (a) and (b) of the new federal act [of 19541, in seeking to bur-

den federal courts with a nonjudicial function of an essentially inquisitional
nature, squarely violate the Constitution of the United States.
37. But see Hofstadter, The Fifth Amendment and the Immunity Act of 1954, 10
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 453, 476-77 (1955), for a statement favoring judicial discretion
to decide the merits of an application for grant of immunity.
38. Subsection (c) provided:
Whenever in the judgment of a United States attorney the testimony of any
witness . . . is necessary to the public interest, he, upon the approval of the
Attorney General, shall make application to the court [for an immunity order],
and upon order of the court such witness shall not be excused from testifying
[on fifth amendment grounds] . . ..
39. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
40. See note 38 supra.
41. 350 U.S. at 432-33.
42. Id. at 434.
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vestigations. He followed closely District Judge Weinfeld's distinction4 3 between a congressional grant of immunity under subsections
(a) and (b) of the 1954 Act and a grant of immunity by a grand
jury under subsection (c) of the Act. Justice Frankfurter stated:
"We are concerned here only with § (c) and therefore need not pass
on this question with respect to §§ (a) and (b) of the Act.""
Thus, the apparent constitutional difficulties presented by the part of
the Act dealing with congressional immunity grants remained unresolved. The Court's opinion intimates, however, that judicial discretion
to review the merits of the government's application for a grant of immunity would violate the separation of powers principle. 4"
THE

1970

FEDERAL WITNESS IMMUNITY ACT:

CONTINUATION OF THE COURT ORDER REQUIREMENT

It was not until 1970 that a valid statute was enacted which contained immunity provisions applicable to all congressional investigations.4 6 In fact, the new Federal Witness Immunity Act applies to
all federal proceedings, including those before federal courts and
grand juries, government agencies, both Houses of Congress, and congressional committees. 47 The Act provides generally that when a witness refuses to testify or to provide information in such proceedings,
testimony may be ordered, but the testimony which is compelled or
43. On the role of the district court in granting immunity in congressional investigations, District Judge Weinfeld recognized that there could be constitutional problems.
But these questions were not involved in the case at hand. "In my view it is unnecessary to pass upon the issue of whether or not a power in the court to approve a
grant of immunity offends constitutional limitations. Section (c), which we are considering, is clear and unambiguous on its face." In re Ullmann, 128 F. Supp. 617, 624
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
44. 350 U.S. at 431-32.
45. The petitioner argued that the district court had discretion to make its own determination of whether the public interest would be best served by exchanging immunity from prosecution for testimony. The Court responded by citing the language of
District Judge Weinfeld:
mhe construction contended for purports to raise a serious constitutional question as to the role of the judiciary under the doctrine of separation
of powers. The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned "if a serious doubt
of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided." [Citations omitted.]
Id. at 433.
46. The 1954 Act was limited to national security investigations. Thus, until the
1970 Act, most congressional investigations were unsupported by immunity provisions.
47. Prior to the effective date of the 1970 Act (December 15, 1970) the immunity
of witnesses was controlled by at least fifty separate statutory provisions. With one
exception, all such provisions have been repealed by enactment of the new uniform
law.
The exception is 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970) which allows United States Attorneys
to seek immunity from prosecution for a witness for any "transaction, matter or thing"
about which the witness may testify. Section 2514 has a repeal date of December 15,
1974. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1970).
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information obtained from the testimony may not be used against the
witness in any criminal case. 48 Thus, the statute provides for "use"
immunity, as opposed to the 1954 Act which afforded "transaction"

immunity, to any witness compelled to testify.

The 1970 Act contin-

ues the practice of requiring a court order as a precondition to immunity grants.49
Section 6005"0 is the specific section controlling immunity grants in
congressional proceedings. The section provides that the court "shall
issue" the order upon request and imposes just two prerequisites, '
both procedural, for issuing the requested order. First, if the proceeding is before a House of Congress, the request for an immunity order

must have been approved by a majority of the members present.

If

the proceeding is before a committee, subcommittee, or joint committee, the request must have been approved by two-thirds of the full
committee membership. Second, at least ten days prior to filing the
immunity request with the court, the committee or House must have
provided the Attorney General with notice of an intention to seek immunity for the named witnesses.
The language of the statute thus indicates that authority is vested
in Congress (or a congressional committee), not in the district court,
to grant immunity to congressional witnesses. The Attorney General's
role is limited, as well, in that when immunity relates to congressional
proceedings (§ 6005), he is deprived of the discretion he enjoys elsewhere under the statute. For court and grand jury proceedings
(Q 6003) ,2 the Attorney General may deny permission to seek an im48. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970), fully quoted at note 10 supra.
49. The order to compel testimony may be sought from the court in advance of
the witness's appearance in a proceeding. However, the order becomes effective only
after the witness refuses to testify on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination
(§ 6002). Thus the statute is, in principle, a "claim" immunity act, and rejects the
"automatic" immunity language of some earlier statutes.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 6005 (1970), fully quoted at note 10 supra.
51. However, it is taken as granted by the statute that:
(1) the individual from whom testimony is sought has been or may be called
to testify, (2) the witness refuses or will refuse to give testimony on the basis
of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, (3) the request from
the concerned House of Congress or committee is made through a duly authorized representative, and (4) the proposed order indicates that the witness['s] privilege against self-incrimination is to be supplanted by the limited
immunity conferred under section 6002.
Select Committee on Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 n.10 (D.D.C.
1973).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1970). Court and grand jury proceedings.
In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify
(a)
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court
of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States
district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be
held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the
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munity order from the court. Although section 6005 permits the Attorney General to apply to the court for a twenty-day extension, no
veto power or other authority is given to him.
The legislative history of section 6005 reveals that the lawmakers
intended the court, in normal circumstances, to grant immunity without
participating in the policy decision as to whether or not the order is
desirable. After specifying the procedural prerequisites for the issuance of an order, the House Report states:
The court must defer issuance up to 20 days at the Attorney General's request. As in administrative proceedings, however, the
Attorney General is not given veto power. Nor is the court given
any 5power
to withhold the order if the factual prerequisites are
3
met.

The model for what is now section 6005 originated with the National Commission on the Reform of Federal Criminal Laws.54 The
Commission's recommendations concerning provisions for congressional proceedings were adopted and implemented in the statute without substantive changes. 55 In its Working Papers, the Commission
request of the United States attorney for such district, an order requiring such
individual to give testimony or provide other information which he refuses
to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such
order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b)
A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his
judgment(1)
the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2)
such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
53. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1970).
The Senate Report
contains an almost identical statement. See S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
146 (1969).
54. The Commission was appointed by Congress in 1966 "to undertake a study of
the Federal criminal laws and recommend improvements." The Commission consisted
of twelve members: three appointed by the President, three federal judges appointed
by the Chief Justice, three Senators appointed by the President of the Senate, and three
members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker. Hearings on S. 30
Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 280 (1969).
55. As drafted by the Commission, the proposed statute read:
Section (4). Immunity Before Congress.
(a)
When the testimony or other information is to be presented to either
House or a committee of either House or a joint committee of both Houses
of Congress, the direction to the witness to testify or produce other information shall be issued by a United States District Court, upon application therefor by a duly authorized representative of the House or committee concerned,
and subject to the requirements of this section.
(b)
Before issuing the direction, the court must find that application was
authorized, in the case of proceedings before one of the Houses of Congress,
by affirmative vote of a majority of the members present of that House, or
in the case of proceedings before a committee, by affirmative vote of two-
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discussed in some detail the language and intent of what is now section 6005. Regarding the role of the district court, the Commission
stated:
[P]roblems both of constitutionality and of insufficiency of
information for meaningful judicial scrutiny have been averted by
making the court's function a weak and paltry thing-ministerial,
not discretionary in nature.
The draft statute, accordingly, in continuing the requirement of
application to a United States district court, makes more clear
than the present statute the intention that the court's function is
not discretionary. The court "shall" issue the direction to testify
subject to a finding that the procedural requirements concerning
specified voting arrangements in Congress, and notice to the Attorney General, have been met. 5 6
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: ASCERTAINING
PROCEDURAL REGULARITY AND BEYOND

This brief review of the statutory language, legislative history, and
the Commission's comments makes it clear that, under section 6005,
the district court was not intended to participate actively in the policy
decision as to the desirability of granting immunity to a particular witness. The drafters' intentions were legitimate in light of the Ullmann
decision and the unresolved constitutional questions raised by the ambiguous language of subsections (a) and (b) of the 1954 Act.5 7 The
question which logically arises is: Why was the practice of requiring
a court order as a prerequisite to the granting of immunity continued?
The statutory language of section 6005 indicates only one purpose
to be served by participation of the district court in the immunity
granting process. The court is to act as a checkpoint for assuring proper compliance with the established procedural prerequisites. Thus,
there must be a showing that the specified voting arrangements have
been followed by Congress, and that adequate notice has been given
to the Attorney General.58 This type of review is clearly within the
thirds of the members of the full committee.
(c) Notice of the application for issuance of the direction shall be served
upon the Attorney General at least ten days prior to the date when the application is made. Upon the request of [the] Attorney General, the court shall
defer issuance of the direction for not longer than thirty days from the date
of such notice to the Attorney General.
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 25, at 1448.
56. Id. at 1440.
57. See note 31 supra.
58. Congress has not adopted any further internal rules regarding immunity grants
under section 6005. The reluctance of Congress to do so may be due to its fear that
mandatory procedures, even though self-imposed, might lead to control by the judiciary.
In Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963), the Supreme Court reversed the con-
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Under past and present im-

munity statutes federal courts have assumed the power of review to
ascertain procedural regularity before granting immunity orders. 9
Such review may be at the witness's request since he is entitled to

notice of congressional intention to seek an immunity order and has
a right to intervene in the district court proceeding. 60
Though not apparent from the face of the statute, there may be
other grounds on which the court may properly refuse to grant a requested order. The Commission has suggested that the court might
go beyond the checking of procedural requirements and exercise functions which derive largely from the court's inherent powers.6 1 Thus,
the application to a district court could be converted into a type of
declaratory judgment proceeding. The court's concern would not be
with the prosecutorial-legislative wisdom of conferring immunity, but
rather with these issues: constitutional privilege claims of the witness;
constitutional jurisdiction of Congress over the area of inquiry; statutory (or resolution) jurisdiction of -the congressional committee over
the inquiry; and relevance of the information sought to the authorized

inquiry.

62

Traditionally, these issues have 'been raised by the witness at a later
stage in the proceedings-as defenses to a criminal prosecution for
contempt of Congress. 63 Those who have attempted to halt or delay
tempt conviction of a witness who refused to testify in public session of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. The Court found that the House had violated
its own rule by not considering the witness's request for an executive session.
Under the court-grand jury section of the statute (§ 6003), in addition to the procedural requirements set forth therein, the Department of Justice has further established
its own internal guidelines regarding an application to compel testimony. The guidelines are set forth in a letter dated November 30, 1971, from Deputy Attorney General
Richard G. Kleindienst to Hon. Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee. Hearings on H.R. 2589, 8829, and 10689 Before Subcommittee No. 5
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 68-71 (1971).
It has been argued that the government's failure to establish strict compliance with
these guidelines should be grounds for the district court to deny the requested immunity
order. Thus far, the courts have rejected this contention, holding that section 6003
sets forth the only procedural requirements that must be met before an immunity order
may be entered. See In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir. 1972), and In re
Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1081 n.1 (D.C. Conn. 1972).
59. See, e.g., In re Bart, 304 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1962); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 317 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
60. In re McElrath, 248 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1957). One of the opinions of a
divided court derived the right of intervention from Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id. at 616 (opinion of Chief Judge Edgerton endorsed by three
judges).
The other opinion announced a right to notice and hearing, but did not
clearly indicate whether the right was constitutionally founded in due process considerations, or statutorily derived from presumed congressional intent concerning the needed
formality of ascertaining procedural regularity. Id. at 617 (opinion of D.C. Circuit
Court Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger endorsed by four judges).

61.

WORKING PAPERS,

62.
63.

Id.
For refusal to appear before a legislative committee or willful refusal to answer
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congressional investigations as an alternative to challenging their legit-

imacy in subsequent contempt proceedings have consistently been un4
6

successful.
A more specific impediment to the development of this declaratory
judgment type of practice is presented by a federal appellate court
decision under the 1954 Act. One of the opinions by a divided court
in In re McElrath65 suggested that a witness, in contesting the congressional application for a court order, may at that stage raise only
procedural objections not extending to such matters as jurisdiction and
relevancy. 66 However, Chief Judge Edgerton's opinion in McElrath,
endorsed by three judges on this issue, proposed no restraints on the
scope of the witness's challenge in a pre-testimony hearing.6 7 Instead,
Judge Edgerton emphasized the importance of the witness's right to
intervene. He recognized the serious injury to the witness in terms of
reputation and economic and social interests, which often is the result
of compelled self-incriminating testimony.6 s
The traditional reluctance of the courts to grant pre-testimony relief
to congressional witnesses is apparently derived from general principles of prematurity in reaching constitutional and jurisdictional issues.
The Commission has suggested that this viewpoint is subject to modification as judicial concepts of the proper scope of preventive relief
on constitutional issues broaden. 69 The Supreme Court has recognized that defense of a criminal prosecution will not always insure
ample vindication of one's constitutional rights. In Dombrowski
v. Pfister, the Court stated that where first amendment freedoms are
endangered, "we have not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their rights."70 Whether
particular inquiries the recalcitrant witness may be prosecuted by Congress pursuant
to 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970). See, e.g., Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352 (D.C.
Cir. 1938); Fields v. United States, 164 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
64. For example, in Hearst v. Black, 87 F.2d 68, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1936), the court
asserted that it could no more enjoin legislative activity than it could enjoin the enactment of unconstitutional laws. For a suggestion that the validity of a congressional
committee's demand for testimony or other information be tested in a civil suit rather
than the traditional contempt proceeding, see Sky, Judicial Review of CongressionalInvestigations: Is There an Alternative to Contempt?, 31 GEO.WASH. L. REv. 399, 419-28
(1962).
65. 248 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
66. Id. at 617 (opinion of Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger endorsed by four other

judges).
67. Id. at 616.
68. Immunity statutes, paralleling the fifth amendment privilege, generally protect
only against criminal prosecution and not against incidental civil and economic disabilities resulting from implication or admission of guilt. WORKING PAPERS, supra note
25, at 1414-16.
69. Id. at 1441.
70. 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). A subsequent decision of the Supreme Court,
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the Supreme Court will extend this reasoning to allow congressional
witnesses to raise jurisdictional and constitutional claims at the pretestimony stage remains to be seen. Under the 1970 Federal Witness
Immunity Act, however, some district courts have gone beyond ascertaining procedural regularity and have considered constitutional claims
71
of witnesses as grounds for denying or conditioning immunity orders.
The court may deny the requested immunity order on constitutional
grounds without violating the separation of powers principle. The
following statement of Judge Hofstadter of the Supreme Court of New
York is illustrative:
Vital interests of both the United States and the witness are involved. Can there be a more acceptable forum for the determination of the rights of the parties than the courts? For the judiciary to be called upon to hold the scales between citizen and government is at least as old as Magna Carta. . . . In the very nature of government, the separation of powers between legislative,
executive, and judicial cannot be absolute. At given points they
blend; a certain degree of interlocking is necessary for the functioning of all and each may play its proper part without violence
to basic constitutional concepts. . . . Hence, restriction to justiciable issues cannot be so circumscribed as to preclude judicial
participation in determining whether testimony
in exchange for
72
immunity is in the best interests of the country.
While the argument is founded upon a series of valid premises, the
alleged conclusion is constitutionally questionable. Indeed, the government and the witness each do have vital interests at stake and
courts are often called upon to balance competing interests. Separation
of powers is not absolute, for ours is also a system of checks and balances. However, immunity statutes are not generally regarded as providing a proper occasion for use of the balancing test. The only balancing involved is the legislative-prosecutorial decision as to the importance of -the testimony versus the diminished opportunity to prosecute
the witness. The proper issue for the court is whether the immunity extended to the witness is coextensive with the protection provided by
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 73
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), emphasized that Dombrowski was based on
two major factors: (1) the state statute was allegedly vague and overly broad; and
(2) the appellants alleged bad faith and harassment on the part of the prosecutorial
officials. The Court's apparent determination to limit the scope of Dombrowski may
prove significant not only in cases of federal relief against state prosecutions but also
in analogous situations where persons attempt to block future prosecutions.

71.

See cases discussed infra at pp. 489-90.

72.

Hofstadter, supra note 37, at 476-77.

73.

Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892).
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CONFLICT RESOLVED?

The conflict over what form of immunity will adequately protect
the witness who is compelled to testify has centered around two types
of immunity grants: use immunity and transactional immunity.7 4 In
Counselman v. Hitchcock"5 the Supreme Court held that a statute which
did not protect against derivative use of testimony was constitutionally
inadequate to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination. The
Court stated that to be valid a statute "must afford absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates."7 6
After Counselman transactional immunity became the accepted constitutional standard for subsequent immunity statutes.7" However, the
standard did not apply to the states because the Court had not yet
held that the privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Moreover, under the separate sovereignty doctrine, another jurisdiction was not bound by the immunity granted by the jurisdiction which
compelled the testimony.78 Thus, until 1964 transactional immunity
was important only in determining the effect upon federal prosecutions
of immunity given in exchange for testimony compelled by federal
officials.
In 1964, the Supreme Court rejected the separate sovereignty doctrine. The Court held in Malloy v. Hogan79 that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Murphy v.
74. See note 8 supra. As used herein, "use immunity" includes protection against
derivative use of compelled testimony. Under this standard the prosecution is prohibited from using evidence produced from leads derived from compelled testimony, in addition to being foreclosed from introducing the compelled testimony in a subsequent
prosecution against the witness.
75. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
76. Id. at 586.
77. Counselman's adoption of the transactional immunity standard was' arguably
dicta, since the statute under consideration in that case did not even provide for full
use immunity. The Court reaffirmed its adherence to the transactional standard four
years later, in upholding a statute which was drafted in response to Counselman.
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595 (1896). Subsequent federal statutes were drafted
to provide transactional immunity. See Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, 4
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 549, 553 & n.22 (1957). The Court continued to affirm the constitutional necessity of transactional immunity as late as 1956. In Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956), the Court stated that transactional immunity statutes
have "become part of our constitutional fabric."
78. In Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 379 (1958), the Court held that a witness granted immunity by a state could not refuse to testify because of fear of federal
prosecution. The Court established in United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149
(1931), that protection against state prosecution was not essential to the validity of
federal immunity statutes.
79. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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Waterfront Commission,"0 decided on the same day as Malloy, the
Court announced for the first time that a grant of immunity by one
jurisdiction might affect the conduct of other jurisdictions with respect
to prosecution of a witness who had been compelled to testify.
In Murphy petitioners had been granted immunity from prosecution
under the laws of New York and New Jersey. They nevertheless refused to testify because they feared prosecution under federal law,
to which the immunity grant did not extend. The Court held that
a witness in a state proceeding may not be compelled to give testimony which might incriminate him under federal law. However,
rather than holding that the witness would be immune from subsequent federal prosecution for any transaction about which he was compelled to testify, the Court held that, at least in the inter-jurisdictional
setting, use immunity was adequate protection. Thus, the witness
could subsequently be prosecuted for crimes concerning which he had
given compelled testimony, provided the federal prosecutors could
show that evidence used in the subsequent prosecution was indepen81
dently obtained.
The 1970 Federal Witness Immunity Act provides protection in the
form of use immunity to the witness who is compelled to testify. In
Kastigar v. United States82 the Supreme Court held that use immunity, even in the intra-jurisdictional setting, 'is adequate to supplant the
protection of the fifth amendment.8 3 While the Kastigar decision resolved the conflict between use and transactional immunity, it has created
some new problems.8 4 The Court apparently held that on its face
the use immunity provided by section 6002 is coextensive with the scope
of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is suffi80.
81.

378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Id. at 79.

82. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
83. Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stated: 'Transactional immunity,
which accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled

testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the
Fifth Amendment privilege," and thus is not required because "[wihile a grant of immunity must afford protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, it
need not be broader." Id. at 453.

84. A major problem created by the Court's adoption of use immunity is a practical
one-how can a witness realistically be protected against use of his testimony or its
fruits in a subsequent prosecution? The Court's solution was to place a heavy burden
of proof on the government to show that its evidence was independently obtained. Id.
at 460. Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, argued that such protection is not
commensurate with the witness's privilege, and that transactional immunity is necessary
to provide a reliable guarantee that the testimony will not be used against the witness.

Id. at 467-69.
On this issue, and others, the Court's decision has evoked considerable criticism
among legal writers. See generally, Comment, Kastigar v. United States: The Required Scope of Immunity, 58 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1972); Comment, Standards for Ex-
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cient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. 85 However, the
possibility remains that, as applied, the statute may be unconstitutional.
In a limited number of fact situations, the immunity order may not provide even for use immunity.86
Use immunity may provide insufficient protection to supplant the
witness's privilege in a fact situation where there is a possibility of
prosecution by a foreign government based on compelled testimony.
In Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation,s" decided
on the same day as Kastigar, the Supreme Court reviewed a contempt
conviction of a witness who refused to testify despite being granted
immunity under a New Jersey statute. 88 This statute provided protection from use and derivative use of compelled testimony. The witness
refused to answer questions of a state commission concerning organized crime, racketeering and political corruption. The Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction to consider the witness's claim that a grant
of use immunity cannot supplant the fifth amendment privilege with
respect to an individual who has a real and substantial fear of foreign
prosecution.8 9 The Court concluded, however, that it was not necessary to decide the constitutional issue, because the questions asked
of the witness were not viewed by the Court as calling for answers
that gave the witness a reasonable basis for fearing foreign prosecution.9"
Thus, the Supreme Court left unresolved two related issues: (1)
whether the fifth amendment may be successfully invoked as protection against fear of foreign prosecution; and (2) if so, whether immunity, which cannot prevent foreign prosecution, is therefore inadequate to replace the privilege in a situation where the witness has a
clusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171 (1972);
Comment, Testimonial Immunity Adopted in Kastigar v. United States to Supplant
Prior Federal Immunity Grants, 4 LOYOLA CHI. L.J. 193 (1973).
We conclude that the immunity provided by 18 U.S.C. § 6002 leaves the
85.
witness and the prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as
if the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege. The immunity
therefore is coextensive with the privilege and suffices to supplant it.
406 U.S. at 462.
86. In holding the statute unconstitutional as applied, one district court prefaced

its decision with this statement: "Kastigar does not foreclose the inquiry presented in

this case: may the granting of an immunity order pursuant to the use immunity statute fail to provide immunity coextensive with the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege in a particular instance?" In re Baldinger, 356 F. Supp. 153, 156 (C.D. Cal.

1973).
87.
88.

406 U.S. 472 (1972).
N.J. REV. STAT. § 52: 9m-17a (1970).

89. Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, 401 U.S. 933, 934
(1971).
90. 406 U.S. at 478-81. "[T]he privilege protects against real dangers, not remote and speculative possibilities." Id. at 478.
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By the very fact

of its indecision, however, the Court implied that merely because a
statute provides use immunity does not mean the courts are precluded
in all instances from considering the question of whether the witness
is given protection commensurate with his fifth amendment privilege.
The lower federal courts have confronted the foreign prosecution
issue in the context of grand jury investigations. The Fifth9 1 and
Tenth Circuits 92 both held that because of the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings, insured by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e),9 3
no substantial risk of foreign prosecution was posed. One district
court, however, has held to the contrary. 94 The issue has not arisen
in the context of congressional immunity grants, but it would seem
that a substantial fear of foreign prosecution may be grounds for a
district court to deny a requested court order under section 6005.
There is no comparable rule of secrecy in this setting. As an alternative to outright denial, the court might condition the order by compelling the witness to tes-tify only in executive session.
The Federal Witness Immunity Act provides that, when immunity
is conferred, no testimony or information may be used against the wit-

ness in any criminal case "except a prosecution for perjury, giving a
false statement or otherwise failing to comply with the order." 95 This
91. In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 811-12 (5th Cir. 1972).
92. In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067-70 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded for
dismissal as being moot, Parker v. United States, 397 U.S. 96 (1970).
93. Rule 6.
The Grand Jury.
(e)
Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure. Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any
juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded
testimony may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so
directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a
showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy
may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this rule. The
court may direct that an indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant
is in custody or has given bail, and in that event the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shall disclose the finding of the indictment except
when necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
94. In In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D.Conn. 1972), decided after Zicarelli, Tierney, and Parker, the court reasoned that non-disclosure of grand jury minutes
was dependent on law enforcement officials' good faith compliance with Rule 6(e).
The court said that the existence of judicial control which the Supreme Court relied
upon in Kastigar was absent in this situation, and that "constitutional protection of
the witness must rest on more than faith." Id. at 1082. The court relied on Murphy
for the rule that the privilege can be asserted in the forum of one sovereign to guard
against prosecution in the courts of another sovereign. Id. at 1085.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1973).
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exception clause has created confusion as to the scope of protection
provided by an immunity grant. In In re Baldinger,9 6 the district court
refused to grant a requested immunity order because of this clause.
The court felt that the grand jury witness might be subjected to prosecution for allegedly false statements made to F.B.I. agents prior to
the granting of immunity. 7
If the statute in fact contemplates use of compelled testimony for
such a prosecution, then clearly the immunity conferred is not coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination.
While the fifth
amendment does not reach forward to protect against future acts, it
does protect a person from being forced to incriminate himself with
respect to crimes committed in the past.9
For this reason immunity statutes generally contain exceptions for perjury, but the exclusion
from immunity has always been limited to perjury committed during
the compelled testimony.99 While the 1970 Act uses less restrictive
language than such predecessor statutes, most courts have held, contrary to Baldinger, that the exception applies only to future perjury,
future false statements, or future failure to comply with the immunity
order. 100 Thus construed, the statute provides the same protection
as does the fifth amendment itself.
While the court's decision on the merits in Baldinger represents a
minority view, some of the language in the opinion is valuable in assessing the proper role of the district court when an immunity order is
requested. The court recognized that it could not review the United
States Attorney's administrative decision in seeking a grant of immunity.'
Nevertheless, the court said that it did have discretion to decline to issue the immunity order in the face of a violation of the witness's constitutional rights. 10 2 Another district court, while overruling
the witness's objection to being granted immunity, conditioned the
order to make clear that the exceptions proviso had prospective appli96.
97.

356 F. Supp. 153 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
Id. at 163.

98.

"[T]he immunity afforded by the constitutional

guarantee

relates to the

past and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.
Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 (1911).
99. For example, the Immunity Act of 1954, Act of August 20, 1954, ch. 769, 68
Stat. 745, provided that no witness was exempt from "prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while giving testimony or producing evidence under compulsion as
provided in this section."
100. See United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1028 (9th Cir. 1973); Application
of United States Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361 F.
Supp. 1282, 1283 (D.D.C. 1973); In re Cahalane, 361 F. Supp. 226, 228 (E.D. Pa.

1973).
101.
102.

356 F. Supp. at 168-69.
Id. at 170.
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cation only. 10 3 These two cases indicate that when the witness's con-

stitutional rights are jeopardized, the district court's role becomes more
than ministerial. It may rightfully deny or condition the immunity order
to protect the witness.
BEYOND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Aside from the question of whether the immunity to be conferred
is coextensive with the witness's fifth amendment privilege, there are
other grounds' upon which the district court could conceivably refuse

to compel a witness to testify. Use immunity overcomes only those
testimonial privileges based on self-incrimination. The witness may
well have other statutory and constitutional claims which the court
could consider at the pre-testimony hearing.
One statutory privilege claim which the witness might assert is that
contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2515.1°5 In Gelbard v. United States0° '
the Supreme Court held that a grand jury witness adjudicated in con-

tempt for refusing to testify may invoke section 2515 as a defense.
The statute protects individuals from evidentiary use of information
obtained by illegal government wiretaps or other methods of electronic
surveillance. The Court went one step further and said a witness may
refuse to answer questions which are based upon illegal interception
of his communication.' 7 A logical extension of this rationale would
103. In re Cahalane, 361 F. Supp. 226, 229 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The order compelling the witness to testify ended with the following language:
[N]o testimony or other information compelled under this order, or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information, shall be used against Daniel Cahalane in any criminal case, except
that the said Daniel Cahalane shall not be exempted by this order from prosecution for contempt committed while giving testimony as ordered herein, for
future perjury, or for false statements hereafter made [emphasis added].
Id.
104. The treatment given herein to these other grounds is but a cursory review of
judicially imposed jurisdictional restraints on congressional investigations. The reason
for including this discussion is simply to call attention to the fact that courts may begin
to consider these issues at the pre-testimony stage, as opposed to a later time in the
proceedings. For more comprehensive analyses of judicial restraints on congressional
investigations, see generally, Shapiro, Judicial Review: PoliticalReality and Legislative
Purpose: The Supreme Court's Supervision of Congressional Investigations, 15 VAN.
L. REv. 535 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro]; Commentary, Congressional Investigations: Their Effect on a Witness' Right to a Fair Trial, 22 ALA. L. REV. 554 (1970).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970):
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part
of the contents of such communications and no evidence derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
106. 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
107. The Court found additional support for its holding in 18 U.S.C. § 3504
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be to allow a witness to raise section 2515 as an objection to the court's
granting of an immunity order.
The witness may also wish to raise other constitutional claims at
the pre-testimony hearing. The Supreme Court has said that the congressional power to investigate is limited by the Bill of Rights, 0 8 but
has traditionally enforced few restraints, other than those imposed by
the fifth amendment. For example, congressional witnesses have presented claims of privilege under the first amendment, but have been
unsuccessful. Rather than rejecting the possibility that the first amendment may be a shield to congressional witnesses, the Court's rationale
has generally been that first amendment rights were not in fact violated.'0 9
As opposed to claiming a specific privilege, the witness may have
grounds for objecting to the congressional inquiry itself. Traditionally,
the courts have imposed certain restraints of a jurisdictional nature
on legislative investigations. In appropriate proceedings witnesses
have been allowed to attack the constitutionality of an entire congressional investigation 10 or the legality of a particular committee investigation. 1"
Courts have also determined whether particular testimony
112
sought is relevant to an authorized inquiry.
The power of Congress to investigate is not expressly granted by
the Constitution but is implied from provisions authorizing Congress
to enact the nation's laws." 3 The courts have not established comprehensive guidelines to limit the scope of congressional investigatory
power. However, the Supreme Court has held that there must be a
valid legislative purpose served by a congressional probe, especially
where there is a danger of seriously infringing upon an individual's
(1970), which requires the government to affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged
illegal interception. In recent lower federal court decisions, the availability of section
2515 as a defense has often turned on the adequacy or inadequacy of the Government's
denial of electronic surveillance. See, e.g., In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.
1972); In re Marx, 451 F.2d 466 (Ist Cir. 1971); In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468 (3d Cir.
1972).
108. See, e.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1957).
109. See, e.g., Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United
States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). See
also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), where the Court held that neither freedom of speech nor freedom of press was violated by requiring newsmen to appear and
testify before grand juries.
110. E.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135 (1927).
111. E.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
112. E.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Deutch v. United States,
367 U.S. 456 (1961).
113. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
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basic constitutional rights."'
The Court has identified the primary purpose served by congressional
investigations to be the gathering of information for enacting new
laws. 1 5 Congressional investigations also may serve an informing function, whereby the public is educated and pressure is generated for new
legislation." 6 Thus, when a district court is petitioned by the legislative branch to grant an immunity order, it could review to ascertain
whether the entire investigation is serving such a valid legislative purpose. If the investigation is outside the total constitutional scope of
the congressional investigatory power, the witness would not be compelled to testify-under immunity or otherwise.
Realistically, courts rarely find congressional investigations to be
without any valid legislative purpose. 1 7 Because of the separation
of powers principle, the courts have traditionally refrained from interfering with the efforts of Congress to legislate." 8 This deferential
attitude is exemplified by the Supreme Court's holding in McGrain
v. Daugherty."9 There the Court held that although Congress had
expressed no valid legislative purpose in its authorizing resolution, a
valid purpose would be presumed because of the nature of the subject
matter-the failure of the United States Attorney General to prosecute persons involved in the Teapot Dome scandals. The Court
reasoned that "[p]lainly the subject was one on which legislation could
be had .
"1 20
Another barrier to pre-testimony relief is the ripeness issue presented by Hutcheson v. United States."' A witness before a Senate
committee had refused to testify, contending that the questioning re114. See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176-77 (1927).
115. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
116. See note 18 supra. Where the investigation concerned the involvement of specific individuals in illegal activity, the Court rejected mere exposure as a permissible
goal but did not indicate where informing ends and exposure begins. Id. at 200.
117. One writer suggests that the Supreme Court has "erected a virtually irrebuttable presumption of the existence of a valid legislative purpose." Commentary, Congressional Investigations: Their Effect on a Witness' Right to a Fair Trial, 22 ALA. L.
REV. 554, 557 (1970).
118. See, e.g., Fischler v. McCarthy, 117 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 218 F.2d
164 (2d Cir. 1954), where the court held that an injunction would not lie to enjoin
a Senate committee chairman from forcing plaintiffs to produce documents in their possession with respect to loyalty board proceedings at army installations; Nelson v.

United States, 208 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1953), where the court refused to enjoin a

congressional committee from making an unconstitutional search and seizure. In Nelson the court asserted that it did have the power and duty to deny legal effect to
such unconstitutional actions. Id. at 513.
119. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
120. Id. at 177. See also Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir.

1938).

For a discussion of the continuing tendency of the courts to presume a valid

legislative purpose, see Shapiro, supra note 104.
121. 369 U.S. 599 (1962).
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lated to a matter for which he was already under indictment, and that
the only purpose of the inquest was exposure. The witness's concern
was that public disclosure of his testimony before the committee would
endanger his ability to obtain a fair trial. The Court held that, even
if true, these contentions did not excuse the witness's refusal to testify.
The reasoning of the Court, per Justice Harlan, was that, absent a
fifth amendment claim, the only time for the court to consider whether
state trial unthe committee's public hearings "rendered petitioner's
1 22
conviction.
state
the
reviewed
it
fair" was at the time
In a recent district court case, when the Senate Select Committee
sought an immunity order for two of its witnesses, the court faced
both the issues of separation of powers and ripeness. 2 3 The objection
to the order came not from the witnesses, but instead from the Special
Prosecutor.124 Thus, the separation of powers principle seems to support
the court's decision -that it could not exercise discretion to deny or condition the order. The witnesses alleged no invasion of their constitutional rights; the conflict was between the prosecutor and the legislature. This is the type of policy decision which is not properly the
subject of judicial review.' 25
The court also based its decision on the assertion that the "matter
The court said that since
is simply not ripe for judicial action."' 12
had been named
defendants
no indictments had been issued, and no
in the matter, there was no "case or controversy" for the court to con27
front.1
Even assuming that the congressional investigation has a valid
legislative purpose, there are two other types of restraints which the
courts may impose. The court may review to ascertain whether a
committee investigation exceeds the scope of the authorizing resolution, or perhaps is wholly unauthorized. 28 Finally, the court may examine the testimony sought, to determine if it is relevant to the author1 29
ized inquiry.
122. Id. at 613.

123. Select Committee on Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270 (D.D.C. 19"73).
124.
125.
126.
127.

See note 7 supra.
See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
361 F. Supp. at 1280.
Id. Support for the distinction between pre-indictment and post-indictment

hearings can be found in Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952). The
distinction has been criticized as not being significant in itself: "The important question is the effect of the adverse publicity upon the trial." Commentary, Congressional
Investigations: Their Effect on a Witness' Right to a Fair Trial, 22 ALA. L. REV. 554,
578 (1970).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).

129. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Deutch v. United
States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
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CONCLUSION

When the court order requirement was first injected into the scheme
of congressional immunity statutes, the legislators' purpose was to halt
the flood of "immunity baths" which occurred under the transactional
immunity standard. In effect, the district court was named as an arbiter between the legislative and executive branches to settle disputes
as to the wisdom of exchanging immunity for desired testimony or
information. Although the function imposed on the court was constitutionally questionable, the concern of the lawmakers was justified, in
view of the consequences of granting transactional immunity.
With the advent of use immunity as the facially acceptable constitutional standard, the likelihood that immunity baths will be sought by
wrongdoers is significantly reduced. In fact, witnesses may well prefer to retain their fifth amendment privilege rather than testify and
receive this limited form of protection. Thus, there is little need
under the present statute for the court to act as a protector of prosecutorial interests. Furthermore, the legislative history of the 1970
Act indicates that the court was not intended to play such a role.
Under the 1970 Act, therefore, it is submitted that a different emphasis should be placed upon the function of the district court.
The granting of use immunity to a congressional witness is a process
replete with the potential for abuse of the witness's rights. Despite
the Supreme Court's decision in Kastigar, it seems that there may be
particular situations where use immunity does not provide protection
to the witness which is commensurate with that afforded by the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The witness may also
have other constitutional and statutory claims which support his refusal
to testify. Only the strongest circumstances and the fullest guarantee
of protection can justify compelling a confession of crime. This is
especially true when the confession is in a public forum and may be
brought to the attention of millions of persons by the news media.
The admission of guilt under such circumstances involves serious civil
and economic disabilities which the grant of immunity cannot prevent.
In view of the consequences of compelling self-incriminatory testimony of congressional witnesses, it is submitted that the district court
should give increased consideration to the witness's objections before
granting the immunity order. While admittedly there is a national
interest in maintaining an informed and enlightened legislative process, there is also a right on the part of private citizens to be free
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of unwarranted demands to confess involvement in illegal activities.
A witness should not be forced to risk criminal prosecution and sanction in order to test his doubts concerning his duty to comply with
the requests of a congressional committee.
JOHN

H.

LAND
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